Access to justice in environmental cases after the rulings of the court of justice of 13 January 2015: Kafka revisited? by Schoukens, Hendrik
Hendrik Schoukens, ‘Access to Justice in Environmental Cases after the Rulings of 
the Court of Justice of 13 January 2015: Kafka Revisited?’ (2015) 31(81) Utrecht 
Journal of International and European Law 46, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/ujiel.di
RESEARCH ARTICLE
Access to Justice in Environmental Cases 
after the Rulings of the Court of Justice of 
13 January 2015: Kafka Revisited?
Hendrik Schoukens*
By ratifying the Aarhus Convention in 2005 the EU committed itself to guaranteeing broad 
access to justice in environmental matters both at the national and the EU level. Yet, in spite 
of the clear-cut obligations incumbent upon the EU, EU courts have consistently rebuked pleas 
for a softening of the standing requirements in the context of direct actions against EU acts 
that might have an impact on the environment and/or public health. In addition, the internal 
review procedure set out by the 2006 Aarhus Regulation has been interpreted so restrictively 
by the EU institutions that that its added value in the stride toward better access to courts in 
environmental matters remains ephemeral at best. 
This led the General Court to finding that the Aarhus Regulation, by excluding general EU acts 
from the scope of internal review, was in breach of Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention. In its 
recent rulings of 13 January 2015, however, the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) overruled 
the General Court by holding that the Aarhus Regulation could not be reviewed in light of the 
Aarhus Convention. With its refusal to use Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention as a reference 
criterion for the purpose of reviewing the EU’s compliance with the Aarhus Convention’s obliga-
tions, the CJEU avoided tackling the unsatisfactory level of judicial protection in environmental 
cases at the EU level. 
This paper argues that the rulings of the CJEU are to be qualified as a significant step back-
wards for judicial protection in environmental matters at the EU level. It is established that, 
instead of addressing the current failings of the EU with respect to access to justice in envi-
ronmental cases, the CJEU’s hands-off approach paves the way for yet another decade of non-
compliance by the EU in the realm of access to justice in environmental cases. 
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I. Introduction
Franz Kafka is renowned for depicting his characters trapped in a system of rules and laws that they know 
very little about. The ambiguous relationship between man and ‘The Law’ is probably best reflected in the 
parable Before the Law, which is often viewed as the centrepiece of Kafka’s most famous novel The Trial.1 
In this story, Joseph K., Kafka’s recurrent protagonist, tries to gain admission to the mysterious and elusive 
Court. One day, K. has to show an important client from Italy around a cathedral. There the priest reveals 
himself as a court employee, and he tells K. a story about a ‘man from the country’ who comes to a great door 
seeking the Law. Before it stands a doorkeeper who is barring the entrance. He tells the man that he cannot 
go through at the present time. At the end of the conversation, as the ‘man from the country’ is dying, he 
wonders why, even though everyone seeks the Law, no one else has come in all these years: ‘Everyone strives 
to reach the Law so how does it happen that for all these years no one but myself ever begged for admit-
tance?’. The doorkeeper replies that since the man is dying, he is going to close the door. 
It is only a small step from K.’s frustration about not getting access to the Law to the futile attempts of 
environmental NGOs and other individuals to gain direct access to the EU courts in environmental matters. 
 * PhD Candidate, Department of European, Public and International Law, Ghent University (Belgium).
 1 Franz Kafka, The Trial (first published 1925, Penguin Modern Classics 2009). 
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Traditionally, such actions are hindered by the prevailing interpretation of the requirement for individual 
concern, one of the two conditions that need to be fulfilled pursuant to Article 263(4) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) for private entities in order to be able to challenge a legislative 
or administrative EU act. 
Yet the analogy goes further. When questioned by ‘the man from the country’ about the reasons under-
pinning the limited access to the Law, Kafka’s doorkeeper famously replied that, ‘No one else could even be 
admitted here, since this gate was only made for you. I am now going to shut it’. In a similar manner, the 
admissibility threshold put forward by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in its renowned 
1963 Plaumann-ruling requires a private party to prove that he or she is in a unique position in relation to 
the contested administrative or legislative EU act.2 Not surprisingly, this rigid interpretation, which has been 
consolidated by the EU courts ever since, bars public interest organisations, such as environmental NGOs, 
from directly challenging EU acts before the EU courts.3 In itself, this would matter little if the possibility 
to indirectly challenge EU acts through national proceedings – which are subsequently brought before 
CJEU via the preliminary ruling procedure – would effectively counterbalance this lack of direct access to 
EU courts in environmental cases. However, even if the EU acts are implemented through national rules, 
national environmental proceedings often face important obstacles too, such as limited standing at national 
level and reluctance by the national courts to refer the matter to Luxemburg, turning this detour in an inef-
fective alternative to direct access to EU courts. 
The dire position of environmental NGOs before the EU courts stands in marked contrast with recent 
international developments in the field of environmental justice. By ratifying the 1998 Aarhus Convention4 
in 2005,5 the EU committed itself to guaranteeing sufficient access to justice in environmental matters. As 
is widely known, the Aarhus Convention calls for the recognition of a number of procedural rights for indi-
viduals and NGOs with regard to the environment.6 In order to ensure compliance with the EU’s obligations 
under the Aarhus Convention, the European Parliament and Council passed Regulation (EC) 1367/2006 on 
the application of the provisions of the Aarhus Convention to Community institutions and bodies (‘Aarhus 
Regulation’).7 
Some welcomed the Aarhus Regulation as a significant step forward in the pursuit of better access to 
justice at the EU level.8 However, until today, the internal review procedure has not been particularly suc-
cessful in altering the predicament of environmental NGOs to the better. Indeed, a quick glance at the recent 
administrative application of the internal review procedure reveals that most requests for internal review 
filed by environmental NGOs were rejected by the EU institutions. In most instances, it is upheld that the 
contested acts do not constitute measures for which internal review is foreseen.9 
When confronted with the first legal challenges targeting the limited scope of the internal review mech-
anism in Stichting Natuur en Milieu10 and Vereniging Milieudefensie,11 the General Court invalidated two 
decisions of the European Commission in which a restrictive approach to the Aarhus Regulation had been 
applied. It did so by referring to the EU’s obligations under Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention. On appeal, 
however, the CJEU rejected the Aarhus-based discourse in its decisions of 13 January 2015 and avoided a 
 2 Case 25/62 Plaumann & Co. v Commission of the European Economic Community [1963] ECR 95.
 3 Case T-585/93 Stichting Greenpeace Council (Greenpeace International) v Commission [1995] ECR II-2205; Case C-321/95 P Stichting 
Greenpeace Council and Others v Commission [1998] ECR I-1651. See more extensively Nicole Gérard, ‘Access to the European Court 
of Justice: A Lost Opportunity’ (1998) 10(2) JEL 331; Diana L Torrens, ‘Locus Standi of Environmental Associations under EC Law – 
Greenpeace – A Missed Opportunity for the CJEU’ (1999) 8(3) RECIEL 336. For a more recent critical assessment of this case law, 
see Charles Poncelet, ‘Access to Justice in Environmental Matters – Does the European Union Comply with its Obligations?’ (2012) 
24(2) JEL 287.
 4 Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, 
done at Aarhus, Denmark, 25 July 1998 (Aarhus Convention) [1999] 2161 UNTS 447; 38 ILM 517.
 5 Council Decision 2005/370/EC of 17 February 2005 on the conclusion on behalf of the European Community, of the Convention 
on access to information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters [2005] OJ L124/1.
 6 See Jeremy Wates, ‘The Aarhus Convention: a Driving Force for Environmental Democracy’ (2005) 2(1) JEEPL 3, 4. 
 7 Council Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006 of 6 September 2006 on the application of the provisions of the Aarhus Convention on 
Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters to Community 
institutions and bodies [2006] OJ L 264/13 (Aarhus Regulation).
 8 Teall Crossen and Veronique Niessen, ‘NGO Standing in the European Court of Justice - Does the Aarhus Regulation Open the 
Door?’ (2008) 16(3) RECIEL 332, 333. 
 9 Jan H Jans and Gertjan Harryvan, ‘Internal Review of EU Environmental Measures. It’s True: Baron Van Munchausen Doesn’t Exist! 
Some Remarks on the Application of the So-Called Aarhus Regulation’ (2010) 3(2) Rev Eur & Ad L 53. 
 10 Case T-396/09 Stichting Natuur en Milieu and Pesticide Action Network Europe v Commission (CFI, 14 June 2012).
 11 Case T-338/08 Vereniging Milieudefensie and Stichting Stop Luchtverontreiniging Utrecht v Commission (CFI, 14 June 2012).
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legality review of the Aarhus Regulation in the light of the international obligations that are incumbent on 
the EU.12 
The rulings of the Grand Chamber of 13 January 2015 settle a long-running dispute between environ-
mental NGOs and the European Commission about the effectiveness of the Aarhus Regulation in improving 
access to justice in environmental matters at the EU level. 
For the purpose of this article, the landmark judgments of the CJEU are assessed in the light of the recent 
international trend towards more environmental democracy and justice. More in particular, this article seeks 
to elucidate the lack of coherence between the conservative approach used by the CJEU in relation to direct 
access to justice in environmental cases at the EU level and the more ambitious premises and objectives 
upon which the Aarhus Convention is grounded. Additional focus is placed on two alternative approaches 
which, at least according to some observers, might have allowed the CJEU to better align its case law with 
the shift towards environmental democracy. In the last section, this article reflects on the more fundamen-
tal question pertaining to the compatibility of the internal review procedure with the requirements of the 
Aarhus Convention and, subsequently, examines whether the reluctant stance of the CJEU merits reconsid-
eration in the light of the recent international developments. 
II. The Bumpy Road to Environmental Justice at the EU Level: The General 
Court Succumbs to Aarhus in 2012
A. Troubles Ahead
1. Different Ways to Say ‘No’
In order to fully grasp the arguments that are raised in the recent Aarhus-proceedings before the CJEU, it is 
necessary to take a step back and briefly examine the relevant case law developments of the past two dec-
ades. As such, the stark rise in Aarhus-related legal challenges before EU courts did not occur in a vacuum. It 
is the direct result of a decade-long but commonly overlooked struggle by environmental NGOs to get direct 
access to EU courts in environmental matters. 
Rather ironically, the notable decisions of the Court of First Instance (CFI) and ECJ in Greenpeace, dating 
from the mid-1990s, still remain the most seminal judgments on direct access to EU courts in environmental 
matters. As is widely known, the CFI in Greenpeace refused to reconsider its well-established Plaumann-
approach. In refuting the arguments raised by the applicants, the CFI ultimately held that the Plaumann-test 
remained good law regardless of ‘the nature, economic or otherwise, of those of the applicants’ interests 
which are affected’.13 Accordingly, the CFI found that ‘the applicants thus cannot be affected by the con-
tested decision other than in the same manner as any other local resident, fisherman, farmer or tourist 
who is, or might be in the future, in the same situation’.14 The actions of the involved environmental NGOs 
suffered a similar fate. On appeal, a similar reasoning was upheld.15 When being confronted with the sup-
plementary argument that rejecting the direct actions created a legal vacuum, the ECJ maintained that the 
necessary remedies were still available at the level of the national courts.16 In other cases, such as Danielson, 
the CFI used an almost identical rationale.17 
Needless to say, the rigidity of the EU courts in assessing direct challenges of EU acts in environmental 
matters was met with fierce criticism in the legal literature.18 Many commentators questioned whether the 
so-called standard of a ‘complete’ system of judicial remedies in the EU/EC legal order, which had been put 
forward by the ECJ itself in its landmark ruling in Les Verts,19 was lived up to. It was submitted that, in the 
event the EU acts are implemented in national or regional rules, taking the long way around via the national 
courts would again confront the environmental NGOs with different and often severely restrictive rules on 
standing which might hinder cases from getting through to the ECJ.20 
 12 Joined cases C-404/12 P and C-405/12 P Council and Others v Stichting Natuur en Milieu and Milieu and Pesticide Action Network 
Europe (CJEU, 13 January 2015); Joined cases C-401/12 P and C-403/12 P Council and Others v Vereniging Milieudefensie and Sticht-
ing Stop Luchtverontreiniging Utrecht (CJEU, 13 January 2015).
 13 Stichting Greenpeace Council (Greenpeace International) (n 3) para. 38.
 14 ibid para 55. 
 15 Stichting Greenpeace Council and Others (n 3).
 16 ibid para 32.
 17 Case T-219/95 R Marie-Thérèse Danielsson, Pierre Largenteau and Edwin Haoa v Commission of the European Communities [1995] 
ECR II-3051, para 77.
 18 Stichting Greenpeace Council and Others (n 3). 
 19 Case C-294/83 Parti écologiste ‘Les Verts’ v European Parliament [1986] ECR 1339, para 23.
 20 Angela Ward, Judicial Review and the Rights of Private Parties in EC Law (Oxford University Press 2008) 154.
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Nevertheless, the EU courts have consistently dismissed pleas for a more progressive reading of the admis-
sibility requirements in the context of environmental litigation ever since. In particular, the EU courts were 
fearful of a massive influx of direct actions by environmental NGOs, taking into account the relatively high 
number of legal persons in the EU that have as their object the protection and conservation of the environ-
ment. Ultimately the quasi-constitutional status of the jurisprudential definition of ‘individual concern’ 
prevailed over the pledges for a more open approach for environmental NGOs and concerned individuals. 
That said, it is noteworthy to briefly recall the 2002 revolt of the CFI in its Jégo-Quéré-decision, in which 
a more reasonable interpretation of the requirement of ‘individual concern’ was put forward.21 As is widely 
known, this jurisprudential revolution was only short-lived and thus did not help the environmental NGOs 
in their strive for better access to the EU courts. Indeed, in the same year the ECJ overruled the more gener-
ous interpretation of the standing requirements by the CFI in its landmark decision in Unión de Pequeños 
Agricultores (UPA).22 Subsequently, the ECJ also overturned the CFI on appeal in Jégo-Quéré,23 thereby re-clos-
ing the sudden window of opportunity for a broader direct access to EU courts in cases where no implement-
ing measures could be challenged before a national court. Also in its subsequent rulings in environmentally 
related cases, the EU courts quickly fell into old habits and refrained from reconsidering the classical stance 
on standing for private individuals. The 2005 decisions of the CFI in European Environmental Bureau starkly 
exemplified that access in environmental matters was still as remote in 2005 as it was in the mid-1990s.24 
Remarkably, the entry into force of the Aarhus Convention in 2005 did not succeed in prompting the EU 
courts to adopt a more favourable attitude towards the standing requirements for environmental actions. 
In the post-Aarhus era, environmental NGOs and the EU courts continued to differ over the interpretation 
of the standing requirements for direct actions in environmental cases. Among others, the rulings of the 
EU courts in World Wildlife Fund UK, in which the annulment was sought of a CFP-regulation laying down 
quotas and total allowable catches for cod, aptly illustrate the limited impact the Aarhus Convention has 
had on the locus standi of environmental NGOs.25 This case is to be read in conjunction with the decision 
of the CFI in Região autónoma dos Açores, where the CFI, admittedly in an obiter dictum, pointed out that 
Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention referred to the criteria laid down in the national law, and in EU law 
such criteria were set by ex Article 230(4) of the TEC and the related jurisprudence.26 Equally so, the CFI 
set aside the argument that no effective legal remedy would be available if the action were to be declared 
inadmissible in the latter case.27
2. A Subtle Hint by the Aarhus Compliance Committee
In light of the above it is thus safe to hold that the Plaumann-test had become the proverbial bête noir of the 
environmental NGOs in the context of direct actions against EU acts. Alarmed by the reluctance on the part 
of the EU courts to accommodate direct actions initiated by environmental NGOs, Client Earth decided to 
refer the matter to the Aarhus Compliance Committee, which was established in 2002 to review compliance 
by the Contracting Parties to the Aarhus Convention. 
Whereas the Aarhus Compliance Committee decided to defer further consideration of the communica-
tion, delaying certain issues awaiting subsequent decisions of the EU courts in the cases where application 
had been made of the Aarhus Regulation, it did not refrain from criticising the reluctant stance of the EU 
courts on standing in environmental cases in its 2011 partial findings.28 
In its partial findings and recommendation, the Aarhus Compliance Committee did not assess in detail 
each and every possible form of challengeable decision-making by EU institutions or each decision rendered 
by an EU court. However, on a more general note, the Aarhus Compliance Committee held that the consist-
ent application of the Plaumann-test had resulted in no member of the public ever being able to directly 
challenge a decision or a regulation in environmental cases before the EU courts. The Committee highlighted 
 21 Case T-177/01 Jégo Quéré v Commission [2002] ECR I-5137, para 49.
 22 Case C-50/00 P Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council of the European Union [2002] ECR I-6677.
 23 Case C-263/02 P Commission v Jégo Quéré [2004] ECR I-3425. 
 24 Case T-94/04 European Environmental Bureau (EEB) and Others v Commission of the European Communities [2005] ECR II-4419; 
Joined Cases T-236/04 and T-241/04 European Environmental Bureau (EEB) and Stichting Natuur en Milieu v Commission of the 
European Communities [2005] ECR II-4945.
 25 Case T-91/07 WWF-UK Ltd v Council of the European Union [2008] ECR II-00081, paras 81–82; Case C-355/08 P WWF-UK Ltd v 
Council of the European Union [2009] ECR I-00073.
 26 Case T-37/04 Região autónoma dos Açores v Council of the European Union [2008] ECR II-00103, para 93. The view of the CFI was 
also upheld by the ECJ in appeal: Case C-444/08 P Região autónoma dos Açores v Council of the European Union [2009] ECR I-00200.
 27 ibid para 92.
 28 Communication ACCC/C/2008/32 [Part I] [European Union]. 
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that, pursuant to Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention, Contracting Parties have to ensure that ‘members 
of the public have access to administrative or judicial procedures to challenge acts and omissions by private 
parties and public authorities which contravene provisions of its national law relating to the environment’. 
While the Committee explicitly acknowledges that the Contracting Parties are not obliged to establish a 
system of popular action (actio popularis) in their national procedural laws with the effect that anyone can 
challenge any decision, act or omission relating to the environment, they are required to implement gener-
ous standing requirements for environmental cases. In line with its earlier case law, the Aarhus Compliance 
Committee pointed out that the clause ‘where they meet the criteria, if any, laid down in national law’ can-
not serve as an excuse for introducing or maintaining so strict criteria that they effectively bar all or almost 
all environmental organisations from challenging acts or omissions that contravene national law relating to 
the environment.29 As illustrated by the analysis above, the latter is exactly what had happened in the EU. It 
is thus not surprising to see the Aarhus Compliance Committee conclude that if the rigid jurisprudence of 
the EU courts were to continue, unless fully compensated for by adequate administrative review procedures, 
the EU would fail to comply with Article 9(3) and (4) of the Aarhus Convention.30 
B. A Small Spark of Hope for Environmental Justice?
1. Everything Remains Exactly the Same
Despite its strict wording, the Aarhus Compliance Committee was hesitant to issue a clear-cut condemna-
tion of the EU system of legal remedies in environmental cases.31 Apparently, it assumed that the 2006 
Aarhus Regulation, if interpreted in an Aarhus-friendly way, would offer ample review options for environ-
mental NGOs. This immediately touches upon one of the major points of contention in the legal proceed-
ings leading up to the rulings of the Grand Chamber of the CJEU of 13 January 2015. For, as alluded above, 
these lawsuits in essence revolved around the viability of the internal review mechanism that had been set 
up by the Aarhus Regulation in order to live up to the EU’s commitments under the Aarhus Convention. The 
exact material scope of this internal review procedure lies at the heart of the debate on access to justice in 
environmental cases at the EU level. 
For the purpose of this analysis, a major focus is to be placed on Article 10(1) of the Aarhus Regulation. 
It is indeed this provision that delineates the material scope of the internal review procedure. In particular, 
Article 10(1) stipulates that environmental NGOs meeting certain criteria are entitled to request an internal 
review to the EU institution or body that has adopted a certain administrative act under environmental law 
or, in case of an alleged administrative omission, that should have adopted such an action.32 At the time, it 
was believed that by granting environmental NGOs the right to seek an internal review of EU administra-
tive acts, the issue of standing could be solved without having to revise the strict Plaumann-doctrine. Or, to 
put in the words of the European Commission’s Proposal,33 ‘this preliminary procedure was introduced in 
order not to interfere with the right to access to justice under Article 230 EC Treaty, under which a person 
may institute proceedings with the Court of Justice against decisions of which it is individually and directly 
concerned’.34 As a reform of the TEC in order to allow for a more generous locus standi for environmental 
NGOs had to be ruled out from the beginning, the only feasible option left was the creation of a prelimi-
nary administrative review procedure which would then, indirectly, grant the environmental NGOs in ques-
tion access to justice in order to challenge the legality of the written reply issued by the EU institutions.35 
However, in order to get access to the internal review procedure, new admissibility hurdles have to be taken. 
A major constraint is created by the requirement that limits the substantive scope of the internal review 
procedure to ‘an administrative act adopted under environmental law, or an alleged administrative omis-
sion (to adopt such an act)’. By referral to Article 2(1) litra g of the Aarhus Regulation administrative acts 
are further defined as ‘any measure of individual scope under environmental law, taken by a Community 
 29 Communication ACCC/C/2006/18 [Denmark], ECE/MP.PP/2008/5/Add.4, paras. 31, 35 and 41. 
 30 ACCC European Union (n 28) para 93.
 31 ibid para 97.
 32 See more extensively Marc Pallemaerts, ‘Compliance by the European Community with its Obligations on Access to Justice 
as a Party to the Aarhus Convention’ (2009) IEEP Report, 26–27 <http://www.ieePeu/assets/422/aarhus_report.pdf> accessed 
15 March 2015.
 33 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of the application of the provisions of the Århus Con-
vention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters to EC 
Institutions and Bodies, COM (2003) 622 final.
 34 ibid 13.
 35 Aarhus Regulation (n 7), art. 12. 
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institution or body, and having a legally binding and external effect’, restricting the material scope of the 
internal review procedures in a significant manner.36 Yet, by inserting the word ‘individual’, the majority 
of environmental decisions, such as implementing measures adopted by the European Commission in the 
field of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), seem to fall outside the scope of the internal review procedure. 
Unsurprisingly, many commentators, such as Jans and Wennerås, feared that, given its limited material 
scope, the Aarhus Regulation had blindsided the proponents of environmental democracy by its alleged 
progressive ambitions.37 
These suspicions were proven right by the subsequent administrative practice. In the few cases in which 
a request for internal review of an environmental measure of an EU institution had been submitted, the 
relevant EU institution rejected it as inadmissible.38 To compound matters even further, the bulk of the 
requests were dismissed because of the strict interpretation of the notion ‘measure of individual scope’ as 
laid down by the Aarhus Regulation.39 This raised the question whether the internal review procedure was 
capable of fully compensating for the detected deficiencies in the system of legal remedies at the EU level 
in environmental cases. 
2. The Aarhus Convention Saved the Day in 2012
In the previous years, several environmental NGOs sued the EU institutions over their restrictive stance 
on the internal review procedure. Accordingly, the EU courts were asked to shed light on the exact mate-
rial scope of the internal review procedure and, most importantly, its compatibility with Article 9(3) of the 
Aarhus Convention. 
As background for the subsequent analysis and in order to illustrate the cases in which access to justice in 
environmental matters at the EU level is being sought, this section succinctly examines the facts of the two 
cases that ultimately led to the 2015 rulings of the CJEU. In the first case, Stichting Milieu en Natuur, two 
Dutch environmental NGOs requested an internal review of Regulation 149/200840 amending Regulation 
(EC) 396/2005 of the European Parliament and the Council by setting maximum residue levels for listed 
products.41 The second lawsuit, Vereniging Milieudefensie, related to the persistently unsatisfactory air qual-
ity in the Netherlands. In particular, two Dutch environmental NGOs had launched a request for internal 
review against Commission Decision 2560,42 made on the basis of a derogation clause enshrined in the Air 
Quality Framework Directive.43 In both cases the European Commission declined to review the contested 
decisions on the merits by holding that the latter did not amount to administrative acts meeting the criteria 
of Article 2(1) (g) of the Aarhus Regulation.44
Centrally, the environmental NGOs contended that, if it would turn out that the strict interpretation of the 
internal review procedure upheld by the European Commission was indeed compatible with the wording of 
the Aarhus Regulation, Article 10(1) of the Aarhus Regulation would contravene Article 9(3) of the Aarhus 
Convention. 
 36 Common Position (EC) No 31/2005 adopted by the Council on 18 July 2005 [2005] OJ C 264E/18.
 37 Pål Wennerås, The Enforcement of EC Environmental Law (Oxford Studies in European Law 2007) 234; Jan H Jans, ‘Did Baron von 
Munchausen ever Visit Aarhus? Some Critical Remarks on the Proposal for a Regulation on the Application of the Provisions of the 
Aarhus Convention to EC Institutions and Bodies’ in Richard Macrory (ed), Reflections on 30 Years of EU Environmental Law: A High 
Level of Protection? (Europa Law Publishing 2005) 484. 
 38 Reply of the Commission services to Justice & Environment of 26 May 2008 <http://ec.europa.eu/environment/aarhus/pdf/
title_iv/Reply%20to%20J_E.pdf> accessed 15 March 2015; Reply of the Commission services to Justice & Environment of 6 July 
2010 <http://ec.europa.eu/environment/aarhus/pdf/requests/9_reply%20.pdf> accessed 15 March 2015. For a more thorough 
overview, see: Jans and Harryvan (n 9). 
 39 See Hendrik Schoukens, ‘Access to Justice in Environmental Matters on the EU Level After the Judgements of the General Court of 
14 June 2012: Between Hope and Denial’ (2014) Nordic Envtl LJ, 18 <http://nordiskmiljoratt.se/haften/NMT%252c%2022%20
aug%20(2).pdf> accessed 15 March 2015. 
 40 Commission Regulation (EC) No 149/2008 of 29 January 2008 amending Regulation (EC) No 396/2005 of the European Parlia-
ment and the Council by establishing Annexes II, III and IV setting maximum residues levels for products covered by Annex I 
thereto [2008] OJ L 58/1.
 41 Council Regulation (EC) No 396/2005 of 23 February 2005 on maximum residue levels of pesticides in or on food and feed of plant 
and animal origin and amending Council Directive 91/414/EEC [2005] OJ L 70/1.
 42 Decision C(2009) 2560 final.
 43 Directive 2008/50/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2008 on ambient air quality and cleaner air for 
Europe [2008] OJ L 152/1.
 44 Reply of the Commission services of 1 July 2008 to Stichting Natuur en Milieu and Pesticide Action Network <http://ec.europa.
eu/environment/aarhus/pdf/title_iv/Reply%20to%20SNMpdf> and <http://ec.europa.eu/environment/aarhus/pdf/title_iv/
Reply%20to%20PAN.pdf> accessed 15 March 2015; Reply of the Commission services of 28 July 2009 to Vereniging Milieude-
fensie en Stichting Stop Luchtverontreiniging Utrecht <http://ec.europa.eu/environment/aarhus/pdf/requests/8_reply.pdf> 
accessed 15 March 2015.
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In 2012, the General Court presented its views on the Aarhus-related claims. In essence, the Court was 
asked to choose between the two conflicting interpretations of the Aarhus Regulation that had emerged 
in the legal literature so far. On the one hand, there were commentators, such as Jans, who maintained 
that Article 2(1) of the Aarhus Regulation excludes administrative ‘measures of general application’.45 
On the other hand, authors like Wennerås advocated for a more liberal reading of the afore-mentioned 
provisions and thus did not see any need to invoke the Aarhus Convention as an additional means of 
interpretation.46 
The argumentation raised by the environmental NGOs fell apart in two subclaims. However, from the 
outset it was evident that the first subclaim, which basically hinged upon the afore-mentioned progressive 
reading of the Aarhus Regulation upheld by some commentators, had little chance of success.47 Accepting 
the Commission’s argument, the General Court quickly concluded that the contested measures, of which 
the internal review had been sought, qualified as a measure of general nature.48 Thus, applying the strict 
wording of the Aarhus Regulation, no internal review was available for environmental NGOs in the context 
of such administrative acts. 
However, in both cases the environmental NGOs additionally contested the legality of the Aarhus 
Regulation in the light of Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention. In order to adjudicate this ‘plea of illegality’, 
the General Court first had to be ready to accept the Aarhus Convention as a ‘benchmark’ for reviewing the 
legality of Article 10(1) of the Aarhus Regulation.49 It ultimately decided to carry out the requested legality 
review by holding that Article 10(1) explicitly aimed to implement a particular obligation under an inter-
national agreement.50 Instead of pointing to the lack of direct effect attached to Article 9(3) of the Aarhus 
Convention, which would have been in line with the earlier ruling of the Grand Chamber of the CJEU in 
Lesoochranárske zoskupenie,51 the General Court chose to apply the so-called ‘implementation-exception’ as 
an alternative approach vis-à-vis the legality review sought for by the environmental NGOs. In its rulings of 
14 June 2012, the General Court quickly reached the conclusion that the conditions to apply the latter excep-
tion had been complied with since the Aarhus Regulation explicitly referred to the Aarhus Convention.52 
As to the substance, the General Court first had to pronounce itself on the specific nature of the contested 
decision in Stichting Natuur en Milieu. Given the fact that the Aarhus Convention exempted the public insti-
tutions acting in a legislative capacity, legislative acts are not challengeable under Article 9(3) of the Aarhus 
Convention. Not unsurprisingly, the Commission maintained that it had adopted the contested regulation 
in Stichting Natuur en Milieu in its legislative capacity. The General Court, however, dismissed the latter 
argument, as, in its view, the contested decision did not qualify as a legislative act. In particular, it was appar-
ent from the provision on the basis of which said Regulation 149/2008 was adopted that the European 
Commission had acted in the exercise of its regulatory powers.53 
On a more general note, the General Court concluded that the limitation of the concept of ‘acts’ to ‘admin-
istrative acts’ in the sense of Article 2(1)(g) of the Aarhus Regulation was incompatible with Article 9(3) 
of the Aarhus Convention. Although the term ‘acts’ in itself is not defined by the Aarhus Convention, the 
General Court considered the limited scope of the internal review procedure to be in blatant contradic-
tion with the objectives thereof. While recognising that under Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention, the 
Contracting Parties retained a certain measure of discretion with regard to the definition of the persons 
who have a right of recourse to administrative or judicial procedure and as to the nature of the procedure 
(whether administrative or judicial), the General Court ultimately held that the Aarhus Convention does not 
offer the same discretion as regards the definition of ‘acts’ which are open to challenge.54 Consequently, the 
General Court annulled both decisions of the European Commission.
 45 Jans (n 37) 480.
 46 Wennerås (n 37) 235.
 47 Stichting Natuur en Milieu (n 10) para 29; Vereniging Milieudefensie (n 11) para 26.
 48 Stichting Natuur en Milieu (n 10) para 42.
 49 Stichting Natuur en Milieu (n 10) para 52; Vereniging Milieudefensie (n 11) para 52.
 50 Case C-69/89 Nakajima All Precision Co. Ltd v Council of the European Communities [1991] ECR I-2069, para 31.
 51 Case C-240/09 Lesoochranárske zoskupenie VLK v Ministerstvo životného prostredia Slovenskej republiky [2011] ECR I-01255. See 
Mariolina Eliantonio, ‘Case C-240/09, Lesoochranárske zoskupenie VLK v. Ministerstvo životného prostredia Slovenskej republiky, 
Judgment of the Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) of 8 March 2011’ (2012) 49(2) CML Rev 767; Jan H Jans, ‘Who is the Referee? 
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 53 Stichting Natuur en Milieu (n 10) paras 62–69. 
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3. A Bold Step Forward or Maintaining the Status Quo? 
On the surface, the rulings of the General Court appear groundbreaking. And to a large extent they are. For 
the first time ever, EU judges were willing to assess the viability of EU rules on access to justice at the EU level 
in the light of the third pillar of the Aarhus Convention. However, even though the progressive rationale 
underpinning these rulings is remarkable in its own right, some additional caution is warranted. 
The following three points are in order to contextualise the decisions of 14 June 2012 and, in addition, to 
further understand the final outcome of the case before the Grand Chamber of the CJEU.
First – focusing on the compatibility of the rulings of the General Court with the well-established case law 
of the EU courts governing standing requirements for direct actions – it is to be noted that the General Court 
was not swayed by the supplementary lines of argumentation that had been put forward by the European 
Parliament and the Council. Recalling the ECJ’s earlier reliance on the available review options at national 
level, the latter institutions had submitted that the environmental NGOs had sufficient review options to 
their disposal before the national courts. This would in turn justify the restrictive interpretation of the mate-
rial scope of the Aarhus Regulation. Rather surprisingly, especially in the light of the afore-mentioned rigid 
jurisprudence of the EU courts on the admissibility conditions for direct actions in the previous decades, 
the General Court refuted this argument in its ruling in Vereniging Milieudefensie. It did so by holding that 
the Council had failed to show how the applicants could bring an action before a national court challenging 
the contested act at issue.55 Accordingly, the General Court seemed to have modestly stepped away from 
its rather theoretical approach to the dual-track nature of the EU system of judicial protection, which was 
displayed by the ECJ in its much-criticised56 ruling in UPA.57 
While Vereniging Milieudefensie did not concern a direct action against a substantive EU act – and it thus 
remains hard to draw general lessons from it in that regard – it nevertheless marked a significant shift from 
the earlier approach adopted by the EU courts vis-à-vis the availability of effective national remedies when 
interpreting the legal standing requirements before their own jurisdictions.58 In its rulings of 14 June 2012, 
the General Court decided to effectively scrutinise the review options available before the national courts. 
Therefore the rulings of the General Court are to be tagged as an important step forwards for access to jus-
tice in environmental matters at the EU level. They showcased that the General Court would no longer be 
willing to reject a plea for wider access to justice before EU courts whenever no effective judicial remedies 
are available at national level. 
Second – as to the wider implications of the General Court’s allegedly progressive stance on judicial pro-
tection in environmental cases – it needs to be emphasized that the rationale used by the General Court, 
even if upheld by the CJEU, would not have fundamentally cured all the shortcomings of the EU in the 
realm of access to justice in environmental cases. At first sight, the latter assumption seems to stand at odds 
with the progressive discourse that was used by the General Court. As such, the rulings of 14 June 2012 
display a remarkable openness on the part of the General Court towards the Aarhus Convention and thus 
are to be assessed as a providential sign for environmental democracy. For one, it might be maintained that 
the General Court had finally come to terms with the requirements for access to justice in environmen-
tal matters.59 At the same time, some observers, including myself, remained sceptical about the practical 
added value of the rulings of 14 June 2012 in the strive for more access to courts in environmental cases.60 
Admittedly, when measured against the conservative approach towards the Aarhus Convention at the EU 
level that had prevailed so far, the rulings are to be hailed as a welcome step forwards towards a more 
encompassing scheme of internal review in environmental matters. Even more so, taking into consideration 
the landmark decision of the CJEU in Lesoochranárske zoskupenie, in which the CJEU refused to grant direct 
effect to Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention, the General Court could have easily rejected the plea for 
using the Aarhus Convention as a ‘benchmark’ or ‘reference criterion’ for the purpose of a legality review of 
an EU act. By toning down the importance of direct effect as a prerequisite for a legality review of EU imple-
menting measures, the General Court pointed the way to a more viable approach towards environmental 
 55 Vereniging Milieudefensie (n 11) para 76.
 56 See Tim Corthaut and Frédéric Vanneste, ‘Waves between Strasbourg and Luxemburg: The Right of Access to a Court to Contest the 
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 58 See eg Região autónoma dos Açores (n 26). 
 59 See eg Communication ACCC/C/2005/11 [Belgium], ECE/MPPP/C.1/2006/4/Add.2 (28 July), para 31.
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justice at the EU level. It is thus clear that the General Court cannot be accused of having a bias against 
Aarhus. Having said this, it still remains uncertain whether the viewpoints adopted by the General Court 
would have ensured full compliance with Article 9(3) and (4) of the Aarhus Convention. To some extent, 
the rulings of the General Court also inadvertently exposed many shortcomings in the EU system of judicial 
review for environmental matters. In that regard, it is seminal to bear in mind that the General Court only 
annulled the Commission’s decisions about the inadmissibility of the requests for internal review made 
under the Aarhus Regulation. In other words, in spite of the yearlong proceedings, no substantial review of 
the challenged decisions had taken place by June 2012. 
Arguably, such findings are hard to reconcile with the requirements for effective and timely judicial pro-
tection in environmental cases laid down by Article 9(4) of the Aarhus Convention. In essence, however, 
these findings point to the inherent vices linked to the overarching characteristics of the internal review 
mechanism and thus are not to be blamed to the General Court as such. 
Third – widening the view even further – the General Court did make it clear that, at any rate, the Plaumann-
test would remain good law in case of direct challenge to EU acts before the EU courts. In this respect, the 
General Court noted that ‘whatever the scope of the measure covered by an initial review as provided for in 
Article 10 of Regulation 1167/2006, the conditions for admissibility laid down in Article 230 EC must always 
be satisfied if an action is brought before the Courts of the European Union’.61 
Henceforth, the General Court struck down the modest hopes that had been sparked by the earlier deci-
sion of the CFI in Região autónoma dos Açores.62 It is true that, at least in the latter case, the CFI cautiously 
indicated that the Aarhus Regulation might help in creating a wider access to EU courts in environmental 
cases. The judgments of 14 June 2012, however, exemplify the persisting reluctance of the EU courts to 
grant a wider access to justice in environmental cases as far as direct annulment actions are concerned. 
Added to that, the President of the General Court also dismissed the action for interim relief in Vereniging 
Milieudefensie, in which the environmental NGOs had requested the President to impose interim measures 
ensuring that the Netherlands would comply with the applicable air quality standards enshrined pend-
ing the legal proceedings.63 Equally so, the General Court rejected the applicant’s request to order the 
Commission to examine the merits of the request for internal review within a fixed period to be determined 
by the Court itself.64 
These observations are not without relevance. Taken together with recurring time delays linked to legal 
proceedings before EU courts and the other inherent shortcomings of the internal review procedure (see 
infra), it is thus safe to conclude that the rulings of 14 June 2012 still left a lot of defects of the current EU 
review scheme unaddressed. 
III. The Solomon Judgments of the CJEU of 13 January 2015: Missed 
Opportunities for Environmental Democracy at the EU level?
A. Back to Square One
While the practical effect of the rulings of the General Court of 14 June 2012 on environmental litigation 
remained questionable at best, the generous stance towards the Aarhus Convention flared up hopes of a 
shift towards more environmental democracy at the EU level. By considering the impact of Article 9(3) of 
the Aarhus Convention on EU rules, the General Court was believed to have set in motion a process towards 
more accountability in environmental matters. Still, the modest progress offered by the latter rulings of the 
General Court was not certain to last. The European Commission, closely followed by the Council and the 
European Parliament, decided to lodge an appeal against the decisions. Thus the Grand Chamber of the 
CJEU would have the final say on the compatibility of the Aarhus Regulation with the EU’s international 
commitments. In this section, the long-awaited rulings in both cases on the 13th of January 2015 are exam-
ined more into detail. 
The submissions of the EU institutions, which were displeased by the General Court’s more progressive 
approach towards the Aarhus Convention in the European context, focused on two central issues. First 
and foremost, the EU institutions portended that the General Court’s rulings were based on an erroneous 
interpretation of the settled case law of the CJEU on the possibility for individuals to rely on the provision of 
international agreements with the aim of challenging the validity of a EU act of secondary legislation. As to 
 61 Stichting Natuur en Milieu (n 10) para 80; Vereniging Milieudefensie (n 11) para 72.
 62 Região autónoma dos Açores (n 27). 
 63 See also Case T-396/03 R Arizona Chemical BV and Others v Commission of the European Communities [2004] ECR II-205, para 67.
 64 Vereniging Milieudefensie (n 11) para 18.
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the merits of the case, it was maintained that the General Court had erred in law by finding that the Parties 
to the Aarhus Convention enjoy limited discretion in identifying the acts that are subject to an administra-
tive or judicial review pursuant to Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention. 
In its rulings of 13 January 2015, the Grand Chamber of the CJEU decided to follow the submissions of 
the appellants pertaining to the legality review of the Aarhus Regulation in the light of Article 9(3) of the 
Aarhus Convention. Returning to the basic legal principles underlying the invocability of provisions of an 
international agreement, the CJEU set out that provisions of an international agreement can only be relied 
upon to review an act of EU secondary legislation where the nature and broad logic of that agreement did 
not preclude it and, additionally, the provisions at issue were, as regards their content, unconditional and 
sufficiently precise. With reference to its previous ruling in Lesoochranárske zoskupenie, the CJEU held that 
Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention does not contain any unconditional and sufficiently precise obliga-
tion capable of directly regulating the legal position of individuals. By explicitly referring to members of 
the public who ‘meet the criteria, if any, laid down in ( . . . ) national law’, the latter provision is subject, in its 
implementation or effect, to the adoption of a subsequent measure.65 Consequently, the provision could not 
be relied upon to review the validity of the Aarhus Regulation. 
Against the backdrop of the latter premises, the Grand Chamber ultimately decided to overrule the General 
Court’s reasoning. More specifically, it rejected the use of the so-called Fediol- and Nakajima-exceptions as 
a means to bypass the lack of direct effect of Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention. In its ruling in Fediol, 
the ECJ held that it would conduct a legality review of an EU act in the light of WTO-law where the EU act 
at issue referred explicitly to specific provisions of WTO-law, whereas the Nakajima-exception referred to a 
case of legality review where the EU intended to implement a particular obligation assumed under WTO law. 
Although the lawsuits filed by the environmental NGOs had no linkages with WTO-law, these ‘exceptions’ 
been brought up by the General Court in its 2012 rulings in order for it to proceed with the legality review 
of the Aarhus Regulation in the light of the requirements set out by Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention. 
However, the CJEU ultimately held that ‘those two exceptions were justified solely by the particularities of 
the agreements that led to their application’. In addition, in the CJEU’s view, the vague and ambiguous word-
ing of Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention rendered it unsuitable as a reference criterion for the purpose 
of legality review of EU secondary legislation. 
It is interesting to take a closer look at the reasoning laid down by the CJEU. As to the Fediol-exception,66 
the Grand Chamber held that it did not apply to the cases at issue since Article 10(1) of the Aarhus Regulation 
did not directly refer to any specific provisions of the Aarhus Convention, nor did it explicitly confer a right 
to individuals.67 
The Nakajima-exception did not fare any better. The CJEU held that it also could not be relied upon in 
order to justify the review of the Aarhus Regulation in the light of Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention. 
According to the Grand Chamber, the factual and legal background of Nakajima had to be distinguished from 
the cases at hand. In Nakajima the dispute centred on an EU implementing act linked to the antidumping 
system, which was, according to the Grand Chamber, ‘extremely dense in its design and application, in the 
sense that it provides for measures in respect of undertakings accused of dumping practices’.68 Accordingly, 
the CJEU concluded that, in sharp contrast to Nakajima, no implementation-scenario had unfolded in the 
two cases at hand. 
As an additional reminder, the CJEU also recalled that Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention leaves too 
much leeway and discretion to the Contracting Parties when defining the rules for the implementation of 
administrative or judicial procedures in the context of environmental cases.
Most importantly, however, the CJEU underlined that the EU clearly could not have intended to imple-
ment the obligations arising from Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention since the mentioned administrative 
or judicial procedures predominantly fell within the competences of the Member States. Having rejected 
both vested exceptions to the rigid direct effect-approach of EU courts towards international agreements, 
the CJEU concluded that the General had erred in law in both cases by reviewing the Aarhus Regulation in 
the light of Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention.69 
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 66 Case C-70/87 Fédération de l’industrie de l’huilerie de la CEE (Fediol) v Commission of the European Communities [1989] ECR 1781.
 67 Council and Others v Stichting Natuur en Milieu (n 12) para 51; Council and Others v Vereniging Milieudefensie (n 12) para 58.
 68 Council and Others v Stichting Natuur en Milieu (n 12) para 52; Council and Others v Vereniging Milieudefensie (n 12) para 59.
 69 Council and Others v Stichting Natuur en Milieu (n 12) para 54; Council and Others v Vereniging Milieudefensie (n 12) para 61.
Access to Justice in Environmental Cases after the Rulings of the Court of Justice of 13 January 201556
B. There Is (Was) No Alternative, or Was There?
With its outright refusal to review the validity of the internal review mechanism in the light of the Aarhus 
Convention, the CJEU did not have to pronounce itself on the substance of the arguments raised by the envi-
ronmental NGOs in their original claims. As a consequence of that, the CJEU missed a unique opportunity to 
pronounce itself on the loopholes in the EU system of judicial protection in environmental cases.
It is thus likely that the shortcomings of the current EU implementing rules as to access to justice in envi-
ronmental matters will persist through the coming years. In the light of the outcome of the legal proceed-
ings launched against the strict scope of the Aarhus implementations measures, it is very unlikely that the 
EU institutions will consider a review of the existing Aarhus Regulation any time soon. Therefore the rulings 
of the CJEU most certainly leave a sour taste in the mouth of the propagators of environmental justice at the 
EU level. The question now arises whether the CJEU’s approach towards the Aarhus Convention is sound, 
legally speaking. Was there, in the light of the long-vested case law of the ECJ/CJEU on the invocability of 
international agreements, no other option left than reasserting the traditional stance that is reflected in its 
rulings of 13 January 2015? Or, differently put: can the CJEU be accused of throwing out the baby with the 
bathwater with its steadfast refusal to take into account Article 9(3) as a reference criterion for reviewing the 
legality of the Aarhus Regulation?
1. Progressive at the National Level, Conservative at the EU level?
In the light of the existing case law of the CJEU on the effects of international agreements in the EU legal 
order, the reasoning underpinning the rulings of 13 January 2015 looks sound and plausible. As such, 
Article 216(2) of the TFEU stipulates that agreements concluded by the EU are binding on the institutions 
of the Union and its Member States. Still, the binding effect as formulated in the latter provision is not 
sufficient to ensure review of the legality or validity of EU acts. Pursuant to the established case law of the 
ECJ/CJEU, EU courts may only review the legality of a regulation in the light of an international convention 
when the nature and the broad logic of the convention do not preclude such an assessment and where, in 
addition, the provisions of the treaty appear, as regards their consent, to be unconditional and sufficiently 
precise.70 As a consequence, a provision of an international agreement needs to have ‘direct effect’ in order 
to serve as a touchstone for a legality review of secondary EU acts. Only as recent as in 2008 this viewpoint 
was explicitly reiterated by the ECJ in its renowned decision in Intertanko, where it was held that, the nature 
and the broad logic of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) prevented the ECJ 
from assessing the validity of a Community measure in its light.71 
Admittedly, the EU courts have showed some modest openness in some cases. In its recent case law the 
direct effect of not only bilateral agreements with non-member countries aimed at developing a particular 
kind of general relationship with such countries72 but also of environmental multilateral agreements such as, 
for instance, the Barcelona Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution and its 
Protocol, has been recognised.73 However, bearing in mind the fact that the CJEU had, as mentioned earlier 
on, explicitly denied to accord direct effect to Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention in its Lesoochranárske 
zoskupenie-decision, the CJEU’s refusal to proceed with the requested legality review should not come as a 
surprise. Still, notwithstanding the outright logic of the CJEU’s approach, its reliance on Lesoochranárske 
zoskupenie is certainly not flawless. In the latter decision the Grand Chamber of the CJEU indeed held that 
Article 9(3) did not contain any clear and precise obligation capable of directly regulating the legal position 
of individuals and therefore could not be relied upon before a national court. At the same time, however, 
the CJEU, went on noting that Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention, although drafted in broad terms, still 
aimed to ensure effective environmental protection at the national level.74 
Although some scholars have questioned the soundness of the Lesoochranárske zoskupenie-ruling out 
of fear that the CJEU might have ‘stepped into the legislature’s shoes’,75 the judgment is to be seen as 
a bold step towards more effective judicial protection in environmental matters within the ambit of EU 
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environmental law.76 This is particularly the case since the CJEU underscored in paragraph 49 of the latter 
ruling that, ‘if the effective protection of EU environmental law is not to be undermined, it is inconceivable 
that Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention be interpreted in such a way as to make it in practice impossible 
or excessively difficult to exercise rights conferred by EU law’. By doing so, the CJEU underlined the duty of 
consistent interpretation that is resting upon the national courts in this respect.77 
Therefore it remains ironic to note that the Lesoochranárske zoskupenie-decision was heavily relied upon 
by the CJEU in order to block the legality review that had been sought for by the environmental NGOs. For, 
as such, the ruling of the CJEU in Lesoochranárske zoskupenie exemplified that it was willing to overstep its 
classical strict case law on direct effect in order to ensure the effectiveness of environmental law at national 
level. This begs the question of why a similar rationale has not prevailed in a case concerning internal review 
at the EU level where, as highlighted by the General Court, no sufficient legal remedies are available for 
environmental NGOs to directly challenge EU acts before the national courts. 
This being the case, the CJEU was, at least in theory, left with two other alternative lines of reasoning for 
carrying out a legality review of the Aarhus Regulation in the light of Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention. 
The CJEU could have chosen to reassert the application by the General Court of the so-called ‘principle of 
implementation’, as laid down in the afore-mentioned rulings in Fediol and Nakajima, or, alternatively, it 
could have opted for the alternative approach to the requirement of direct effect in the context of a legality 
review, which was developed by Advocate General Jääskinen in which less importance is to be given to the 
precise wording of the provision of international law.78 
In its rulings of 13 January 2015, the CJEU choose to use neither of the two options. In the subsequent 
analysis both alternative approaches are sketched out and examined more into detail. 
However, in order to fully understand the analysis below, a short ‘procedural detour’ is required. For, 
there might be a more prosaic explanation for the CJEU’s reluctance towards at the alternative approach 
vis-à-vis the direct effect of Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention proposed by the Advocate General – 
i.e. the second line of argumentation that is addressed below. In essence, the reasoning of the Advocate 
General merely seeks to substitute the grounds relating to the analysis of whether Article 9(3) of the 
Aarhus Convention may relied upon. In other words, it exclusively touches upon a part of the reasoning of 
the rulings under appeal without challenging their final result, being the annulment of the contested deci-
sions. While the CJEU did not explicitly elaborate on its reasons for not considering the Advocate General’s 
alternative take, it might be submitted that it implicitly provided us with some clues by dismissing the 
cross-appeal that had been launched by two environmental NGOs in its ruling in Vereniging Milieudefensie. 
Here, the environmental NGOs had argued that, albeit without identifying any specific error of law, the rul-
ing of the General Court was vitiated by its refusal to recognise the direct effect of Article 9(3). Importantly, 
at least from a procedural point of view, the CJEU decided to dismiss the cross-appeal for not tallying with 
Articles 169(1) and 178(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the CJEU.79 Along those lines, it might be argued 
that the CJEU, taking into account its limited competence in appeal, was thus effectively barred from 
expressing its view on the additional observations that had been presented to it by Advocate General 
Jääskinen. The Advocate General, in turn, seemed to be of the opinion that, in the light of the conflicting 
approaches towards the invocability of provisions of international law within the EU legal order, the pro-
ceedings did not allow for a final judgement and thus should be referred back to the General Court. Absent 
any further motivation in this regard, it remains challenging to second-guess the motivation underpinning 
the CJEU’s apparent unwillingness to assess the alternative route suggested by the Advocate General. At 
the same time, the CJEU still decided to give a final judgment in the matter, albeit based on its traditional 
approach towards the direct effect of provisions of an international agreement. By doing so, some might 
argue the CJEU, aside any procedural issues, also implicitly debunked the new pathway suggested by the 
Advocate General.
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2. A Too Rigid Approach Towards Nakajima?
As has become apparent from the above-presented analysis, the CJEU explicitly refused to apply the Fediol- 
and Nakajima-exceptions to the cases at hand. Whereas the reasoning of the CJEU might hold ground at first 
sight, it is not completely immaculate, especially given the undesirable outcome for environmental justice 
at the EU level. 
In retrospect, the recourse to the so-called ‘principle of implementation’,80 as upheld by the General Court 
in 2012, might have some merits and thus deserves a closer analysis. 
Earlier research predicted that the application of the implementation doctrine outside of the scope of the 
GATT and WTO agreements would remain the proverbial Achilles heel of the rulings of the General Court of 
14 June 2012.81 Pursuant to Nakajima case law EU courts are able to review the legality of an EU regulation, 
where it is intended to implement an international obligation incumbent on the EU, even when the said 
treaty does not meet the direct effect-criteria. Seemingly, the CJEU’s approach confines the application of 
the Fediol- and Nakajima-exceptions to the specific context of the GATT and WTO agreements, which are, 
as also reasserted by Advocate General Jääskinen in its Opinion of 8 May 2014 in Vereniging Milieudefensie, 
governed by their own logic and system of law.82 
In particular, the CJEU pointed out that the factual background of both cases could not be compared to 
the cases that had led to rulings in Fediol and Nakajima. The simple fact that the GATT and WTO agreements 
are based on reciprocal and advantageous arrangements appears to hinder the application of the said excep-
tions outside of the international commercial policy-context. 
In itself, the CJEU might have common sense at its side in opting for a restrictive application of the Fediol- 
and Nakajima-exceptions. However, it remains unclear whether the Court’s take remains convincing when 
approached from a more broad perspective.
For one thing, the CJEU’s strict reading of the Fediol- and Nakajima-exceptions, if not compensated by a 
more lenient approach towards direct effect as a precondition for international law to be used as a bench-
mark for purpose of a legality review of secondary EU measures, could lead to major differences in the level of 
judicial protection for individuals in cases which relate to the EU’s international obligations. Commentators 
like Eeckhout submitted that both Fediol and Nakajima reflect some type of compromise which was reached 
within the ECJ at the time, striking a balance between the lack of direct effect of some international agree-
ments and respect for the EU’s international commitments.83 However, by confining both exceptions exclu-
sively to the realm of the GATT and WTO agreements or, alternatively, by limiting the principle of EU law 
implementing international rules to scenarios in which the provision at stake explicitly refer to the inter-
national provision, the CJEU can be accused of having raised the bar for legality review so high that one 
might wonder if the exceptions might ever be applied again.84 As rightly held by Pirker, the CJEU’s apparent 
scrutiny towards the implementation principle renders ‘review scenarios’ almost non-existent.85 Accordingly, 
the CJEU seems to turn a blind eye to potential non-compliance scenarios that might arise in other domains 
of international EU policy. 
The implications of both rulings are all the more disturbing because, as such, it may not be doubted that 
the Aarhus Regulation intended to implement the EU’s obligations under the Aarhus Convention. This is, 
amongst others, illustrated by Article 1(1)(d) of the Aarhus Regulation, which explicitly states that the objec-
tive of that Regulation was to contribute to the implementation of the obligations arising under the Aarhus 
Convention by granting, inter alia, ‘access to justice in environmental matters at European level under the 
conditions laid down by this Regulation’. 
This being the case, by opting for a rigid interpretation of the implementation principle, the CJEU sends 
out the message that review of an EU act in the light of international law will remain exceptional. Accordingly, 
the CJEU might indeed be criticised for not taking into account the official aims of the EU, which is, among 
others, to contribute to the strict observance and development of international law (Art. 3(5) of the Treaty 
on European Union (TEU)).86 
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Moreover, on a more fundamental level, the CJEU’s implicit premise is not without flaws. While it is cer-
tainly true that the context of WTO related cases is to be distinguished from environmental cases, the sharp 
dichotomy between both policy spheres does not appear wholly justified. Critics might advance that most 
international environmental agreements are the result of hard and difficult negotiations. Not surprisingly, 
given the major impact the adoption of stricter environmental rules might have on national economic 
policies, many provisions of international environmental agreements remain vague and lack precise and 
unconditional wording. Under the CJEU’s rigid approach, however, such conventions could almost never be 
used as a yardstick for the purpose of the legality review of the EU’s implementing measures. Thus it is worth 
pondering whether the distinct treatment of multilateral environmental agreements will not give way to 
even more non-compliance scenarios in the specific realm of international environmental policy. 
All in all, the rulings of 13 January 2015 mask the unwillingness on the part of the CJEU to expose acts 
of EU institutions to legality review in the light of international law. They are thus characteristic of a more 
reluctant stance to reviewing EU secondary acts in the light of international obligations incumbent on the 
EU. It might be feared that, absent any threat of legality review by EU courts, EU institutions will feel virtually 
immunised from legal challenges when implementing international obligations. Henceforth, an important 
leverage for the observance of international law falls away within the EU legal framework. 
3. A More Promising Pathway? 
Besides the implementation principle, the CJEU was presented with another, possibly even more appealing, 
option to take into consideration Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention in its assessment of the internal 
review procedure set out by the Aarhus Regulation. This ‘novel’ approach was provided to it by Advocate 
General Jääskinen in its Opinion of 8 May 2014 in Vereniging Milieudefensie. As is demonstrated below, the 
alternative road to legality review suggested by the Advocate General would have allowed the CJEU to carry 
out the legality review without having to take recourse to the Fediol and Nakajima-case law. Arguably, it 
provides a more elegant method to uphold the bedrock principles of its earlier case law without necessarily 
having to dismiss the use of the Aarhus Convention as yardstick for the purpose of reviewing the material 
scope of the internal review procedure. 
However, since the presented approach would not lead to an alternative outcome of the proceedings but 
exclusively challenges a part of the reasoning of the rulings of 14 June 2012 of the General Court, the CJEU 
might have implicitly assumed that assessing the viability of this alternative approach did not fall within its 
competence on appeal. As alluded to above, one might deduce this from the treatment of the cross-appeal 
that had been launched by the environmental NGOs in Vereniging Milieuedefensie. Others might read in 
the CJEU’s referral to its traditional case law with regard to direct effect a more compelling rejection of the 
alternative approach advocated for by Advocate General Jääskinen. Be that as it may, below, it is further 
examined whether, irrespective of procedural arguments, an alternative approach to direct effect could have 
led to a more desirable outcome for the afore-mentioned proceedings, especially in view of the objectives 
of the Aarhus Convention. 
In order to fully grasp the essence of the rationale submitted by the Advocate General, a quick tour 
through the extensive body of case law of the EU courts on the legal effects of provisions of international 
law is required. 
While often forgotten, the CJEU has already moved away from its strict case law on the legal effects of 
international agreements within the EU legal framework in some cases. Most famously, the ECJ held in 
its 2001 Biotechnology-decision that, even if the Convention on Biological Diversity did contain provisions 
which do not fulfil the requirements for direct effect, in the sense that they do not create any right which 
individuals might rely on directly before EU courts, this did not preclude a review by the courts of compli-
ance with the obligations on the EC as a party to that agreement.87 
Yet also in its more recent case law the CJEU has showed more openness towards the legal effects of provi-
sions of international agreements in the EU legal order. Reference can be made to the recent ruling of the 
CJEU in Air Transport Association of America and Others (ATA), in which it was asserted that the principles of 
customary international law ‘may be relied upon by an individual for the purpose of the CJEU’s examination 
of the validity of an act of the European Union in so far as, first, those principles are capable of calling into 
question the competence of the European Union to adopt that act ( . . . ) and, second, the act in question is 
liable to affect rights which the individual derives from EU law or to create obligations under EU law in this 
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regard’.88 In support of his reasoning, Advocate General Jääskinen also pointed to the criticism to which the 
2008 Intertanko-ruling had given rise to, especially since the latter ruling appeared to be incompatible with 
the earlier case law of the ECJ, in which the latter had afforded individuals the right to refer to UNCLOS as 
the expression of customary law.89
Building on the afore-mentioned case law and, additionally, reasserting the fact that the EU is a community 
based on the rule of law, Advocate General Jääskinen advocated for a modification of the conditions required 
for direct reliance on international agreements before EU courts. In particular, the Advocate General made a 
distinction between the situation in which an individual wishes to invoke an act of international law directly 
by relying on a right laid down in that law for his benefit, on the one hand, and the situation of reviewing the 
discretion enjoyed by an institution of the EU during the process of alignment of an act of EU law with an act 
of international law, on the other hand.90 This distinction resembles the decisions of the ECJ in Kraajeveld 91 
and World Wildlife Fund,92 in which the latter was asked to pronounce itself on the invocability of provisions 
of EU environmental law before national courts. When faced with preliminary questions on the direct effect 
of some broadly formulated provisions of the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)-Directive, the ECJ did 
not focus on the exact wording of the said provisions and simply urged the national courts to set aside the 
incompatible national rules. Some authors see this jurisprudence as an early example of a more generous 
approach towards the direct effect-requirements in the field of EU environmental law, as EU directives are 
seldom designed to confer subjective rights upon individuals.93 
In his Opinion of 8 May 2014 the Advocate General reasoned that, in order to avoid creating an area free of 
judicial review, the lack of direct effect of a provision of an international agreement should not rule out an 
examination of an EU act in the light of the former, provided that the characteristics of the said convention 
in question do not preclude this.94 For a provision of international law to serve as a yardstick for the purpose 
of legality review, it must necessarily include sufficiently clear, intelligible and precise elements. However, 
most importantly, the Advocate General underlined that such a provision does not need an exhaustive rule, 
allowing that such a provision may be also mixed in nature. Whenever it would remain possible to isolate 
parts of the content of that provision that satisfy that requirement, it must be possible to use it in the spe-
cific context of a legality review.95 In other words, the mere fact that a provision of international law affords 
the Contracting Parties significant discretion in certain regards does not preclude that the same provision of 
international law also contains precise and unconditional rules. 
Subsequently, the Advocate General found that Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention fulfils the said 
requirements and thus qualifies as a ‘mixed provision’. Whereas the Advocate General concedes that 
Article 9(3) requires the adoption of subsequent acts and that therefore individuals could not rely upon it, 
it does contain a clear-cut obligation on the part of the Contracting Parties to ensure that there is a clearly 
identifiable outcome. The Advocate General based his reasoning partly on Lesoochranárske zoskupenie, by 
referring to the CJEU’s statement that ‘(the provisions of Article 9(3), although drafted in broad terms, are 
intended to ensure effective environmental protection’.96 
This ultimately led to the conclusion that, having regard to its objective and its broad logic, Article 9(3) of 
the Aarhus Convention is in part a sufficiently clear rule that is capable of serving as the basis of a legality 
review of the Aarhus Regulation.97 In comparison with the Nakajima-approach used by the General Court, 
the solution offered by the Advocate General has the unmistaken advantage of being better in line with 
existing case law of the CJEU in relation to provisions of EU environmental law, such as the EIA Directive 
(see supra). 
In itself, the Advocate General’s take – especially in comparison with the reliance on the Fediol- and 
Nakajima-exceptions by the General Court – would offer a more satisfactory solution for the detected loop-
holes to which the traditional case law of the CJEU on the legal effects of international conventions in the EU 
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legal order has led. For, whereas the more widespread application of the implementation-approach would 
arguably lead to more guarantees in the context of the international obligations incumbent on the EU, it 
does not present a long-term fix to the perennial issues in this regard. For instance, it might not allow for a 
legality review in cases where the EU act did not explicitly refer to an international agreement. In retrospect, 
it would have been interesting to hear the CJEU’s view in this respect, especially given the fact that the 
lowering down of the direct effect-requirement in the context of a legality review might constitute a more 
comprehensive solution for the Aarhus-related shortcomings at the EU level in the long run. 
The alternative take of the Advocate General seems plausible. In order to be used as a yardstick for the pur-
pose of a legality review of an EU act, a provision of international law does not necessarily need to be exhaus-
tive. As long as a provision of international law at least in part contains sufficient precise and unequivocal 
wordings and sets forth a clear outcome, it would in most instances be able to serve as a reference criterion 
for the purpose of a legality review. In addition, the Advocate General’s stance, if applied on a more general 
scale, also might also help fostering the effectiveness of international environmental agreements within 
the EU legal order. Under this approach, individuals and environmental NGOs will now be able to hold EU 
institutions more easily accountable for the non-observance of the EU’s international commitments before 
national courts. 
However, on the downside, as alluded to above, the CJEU might have had some procedural arguments 
at its disposal not to explicitly consider this alternative approach to direct effect in the afore-mentioned 
proceedings. Yet, at the end of the day, the explicit reference to its Intertanko-decision at least implicitly 
underlines the reluctance of the CJEU to revise its well-vested approach. Indeed, the support for a more 
progressive approach towards the requirement of direct effect in the CJEU’s recent case law appears to be 
rather limited. In the recent case law – perhaps with the notable exception of the afore-mentioned ruling 
in ATA – the conservative approach seems to have taken the upper hand again. Hence the direct effect of a 
provision of international law still remains a prerequisite for a legality review of a secondary EU act. Opting 
for the Advocate General’s approach would therefore urge the CJEU to reconsider its earlier case law on 
this fundamental point. In addition, some commentators downplayed the relevance of the ruling of the ECJ 
in Biotechnology, one of the major references of the Advocate General. In this regard, it is maintained that 
the latter ruling was probably aimed at tackling the incapacity of Member States to seek judicial review on 
grounds of violation of certain agreements, particularly agreements, to which they are themselves as much 
committed as is the EU.98 It would thus not be appropriate to apply this rationale in cases where natural 
persons or environmental NGOs seek for a legality review.99 
As rightly pointed out by Advocate General Jääskinen, however, the automatic and unreserved application 
of the traditional case law of the CJEU in relation to the legal effects of international agreements would, in 
conjunction with the CJEU’s earlier decision in Lesoochranárske zoskupenie, result in the CJEU ruling out any 
substantial judicial review of the EU’s compliance with its obligations under the Aarhus Convention as far as 
access to justice at the EU level is concerned. 
Therefore it remains regrettable that the General Court had not applied a similar rationale in its decisions 
of 14 June 2012, which in turn would have forced the CJEU to explicitly treat the additional arguments 
raised by the Advocate General. Still, with its explicit reference to the Intertanko-rationale, the CJEU ulti-
mately underlined that the CJEU was more preoccupied with preserving its traditional approach towards 
the legal effects of international agreements than guaranteeing sufficient access to justice in environmental 
cases at the EU level. 
IV. The Unfortunate Legacy of the Rulings of 13 January 2015:  
No Distance Left to Run?
A. Practice What You Preach?
With its obstinate refusal to review the internal review procedure in the light of the Aarhus Convention, 
the CJEU has made itself vulnerable to many critiques. It might be tempting to label the CJEU’s stance as 
outdated in the light of the international and EU developments towards environmental democracy. Roger, 
for one, has accused the CJEU of having missed an important opportunity for assessing the adequacy of the 
EU system of legal remedies in the light of the Aarhus Convention.100 While some might credit the CJEU for 
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sticking to its well-established traditional jurisprudence on the direct effect of provisions of international 
law in the EU legal order, it can be expected that many will criticise the CJEU for having opted for a rather 
legalistic approach to the Aarhus-related claims. Instead of moving forward on the path set out by the 
Aarhus Convention, the rulings of the CJEU could be tagged as a significant step backwards for the protec-
tion of judicial protection in environmental cases. Critics of the CJEU might argue that the lack of direct 
effect of Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention provided the CJEU with a convenient excuse to reject a plea 
for reconsideration of its well-vested approach towards access to justice in environmental matters. Others 
might detect a certain ambivalence in the CJEU’s refusal to apply the implementation principle outside the 
scope of WTO and portend that it missed the momentum for reshaping judicial review in the context of 
environmental cases.
Either way, as a result of the CJEU’s hands off-approach, the compatibility of the Aarhus Regulation with 
the EU’s international obligations, will probably not be reconsidered by the EU institutions any time soon. 
This implies that the internal review procedure will only remain accessible in the context of individual acts, 
leaving the bulk of the EU decisions and measures in the environmental sphere outside the material scope 
of the Aarhus Regulation. Having explicitly overturned the rulings of the General Court, the CJEU thus took 
away all remaining hope for substantial enhancement of the position of environmental NGOs in the near 
or distant future. 
In a certain way, the rulings of 13 January 2015 also stand in sharp contrast to the CJEU’s recent progres-
sive stance on access to justice before national courts. 
As is widely known, the CJEU has recently revealed itself as a big proponent of wide access to justice for 
environmental NGOs at national level, both in the context of the provisions on access to justice regard-
ing the second pillar of Aarhus, which have been explicitly implemented in EU law and as regards general 
environmental law enforcement, as provided for by Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention.101 For instance, 
as portrayed by its decision in Lesoochranárske zoskupenie, the CJEU did certainly not shy away from urging 
national courts to reconsider their traditional strict approach towards standing for environmental NGOs in 
its case law. 
It is important to highlight that the CJEU’s decision in Lesoochranárske zoskupenie was by no means 
exceptional. In its 2011 decision in Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland, the CJEU also compelled 
German courts to reconsider their well-rooted ‘Schutznormtheorie’, under which individuals and environ-
mental NGOs only have standing to invoke legal proceedings that are designed to protect their specific inter-
est, in the light of the Aarhus Convention.102 Likewise, the decisions of the CJEU in Boxus103 and Solvay,104 
aptly illustrate that both the Aarhus Convention and the EIA Directive require national courts to trump 
national procedural law, whenever this would be necessary to review legislative acts in the light of the sub-
stantive requirements set out by the EU environmental directives.105 
It is thus clear that, when reviewing access to justice in environmental cases at national level, the CJEU 
does not feel hindered by well-vested national procedural rules or case law. In the light of the consistent 
stream of seemingly progressive case law from Luxemburg on access to justice at national level, the CJEU’s 
conservative approach towards access to justice at the EU level is thus even more puzzling. It is hard to 
reconcile with the strict scrutiny it applies when assessing national procedural laws in the context of envi-
ronmental litigation. As noted by among others Roger, the recent rulings of the CJEU indeed lay bare the 
two different standards for access to justice at the EU and national levels.106 It can be concluded that while 
national courts are increasingly forced by the CJEU to relinquish their well-vested traditional approaches 
to standing for environmental NGOs, the CJEU itself seems unwilling to reconsider its well-entrenched 
Plaumann-doctrine for direct actions. 
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It goes without saying that the CJEU’s reasoning is subject to practice-what-you-preach criticism. However, 
against the backdrop of the CJEU’s previous case law in relation to access to justice at the EU level, the out-
come of the above-examined cases can hardly be called surprising. In line with its earlier case law, in which 
the CJEU consistently dismissed pleas for a more lenient interpretation of the standing requirements before 
the EU courts, the CJEU again referred to the dual-track nature of the so-called ‘complete system of judicial 
protection’ upon which the EU legal order is based. 
In sharp contrast to the rationale used by the General Courts in its 2012 rulings, the CJEU denied the 
argumentation advanced by the environmental NGOs by holding that the Aarhus Regulation concerns ‘only 
one of the remedies available to individuals for ensuring compliance with EU environmental law’ and, in 
addition, underscoring that the implementation of Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention is primarily a com-
petence of the Member States.107
The reliance on the dual-track nature of the system of legal remedies is understandable in itself, espe-
cially when taking into account the entry into force of Article 19(1) of the TEU. This provision intended to 
strengthen legal protection in the field covered by EU law before national courts. It can therefore be main-
tained that the coherence of the judicial system of the EU does indeed not rest solely on having direct access 
to EU courts, but rather on the interlocking system of jurisdiction of EU courts and national courts.108 Yet, 
while the national courts have a crucial role to play in filling gaps in the system of judicial protection, they 
will not be able to provide an all-encompassing solution to the loopholes that are present at the EU level, 
where still a lot of barriers prevent environmental NGOs and individuals from having broad access to justice 
in conformity with the requirements set out in Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention. Moreover, the prelimi-
nary ruling procedure under EU law is not available as a matter of right since it is up to the national courts 
to refer a question relating to the legality of a contested EU act to the CJEU. Thus national court proceedings 
therefore will not serve as a panacea for all ills. 
In this respect, it remains useful to recall that, as alluded to above, the General Court had already rejected 
recourse to national proceedings as justification for the limited scope of the internal review procedure in 
its 2012 rulings, as no national measure appeared to be available to question before national courts.109 
Interestingly, the Aarhus Compliance Committee also reached a similar conclusion in its above-discussed 
findings and recommendations of April 2011.110 Whereas the Aarhus Compliance Committee recognised 
the system of judicial review in the national courts of the Member States and the request for a preliminary 
ruling as significant elements for ensuring consistent and proper implementation of EU law in the Member 
States, it pointed out that indirect legality review through national courts cannot be a basis for generally 
denying members of the public access to the EU courts to challenge decisions, acts and omissions by EU 
institutions and bodies.111 This appears all the more relevant since the draft directive on access to justice 
in environmental cases has not entered into force as EU law. Such considerations, however, have not been 
withheld on appeal by the CJEU in its rulings of 13 January 2015.
Given the importance of the latter arguments in the rulings of 13 January 2015, some important addi-
tional elements are to be raised here. 
First, within the so-called dual-track approach, the possibility of challenging decisions of the European 
institutions would depend entirely on the legal protection afforded by the national courts. As illustrated 
by recent studies, the implementation of Article 9(3) and (4) of the Aarhus Convention can be tagged as 
‘diverging, random and inconsistent’.112 Second, the preliminary proceedings often last several years during 
which, in order to safeguard the effectiveness of the legality review before the CJEU, the national proceed-
ings would have to be suspended, coupled with very strict conditions for interim relief, at least as far as 
legal challenges to EU acts.113 The large delays and costs that are involved in such proceedings make them 
disadvantageous in many instances.114 Third, an exclusive reliance on national proceedings increases the risk 
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of fait accompli-scenarios, which, in turn, goes against the effectiveness-requirements set out by Article 9(4) 
of the Aarhus Convention. 
While the continuous development of the CJEU’s case law with respect to judicial protection before 
national courts must certainly be welcomed as a positive evolution, it may not be used as scapegoat for 
denying modifications to the existing case law on access to EU courts for environmental NGOs and the wider 
public. 
It thus remains highly questionable whether national proceedings can, in cases where national imple-
menting measures are present, serve as a useful and practical fallback option.115 The latter stance was also 
endorsed by Advocate General Jääskinen, who stressed that the preliminary ruling procedure is in itself not 
capable of remedying or filling gaps arising from a restrictive approach towards the implementation of an 
international obligation incumbent on the EU.116 
He additionally pointed out that the EU cannot require Member States to ensure a particular level 
of review in order to fill the gaps of secondary EU law, especially in the absence of any general direc-
tive on access to justice in environmental matters aimed at implementing Article 9(3) of the Aarhus 
Convention.117 
In addition, although not explicitly alluded to by the CJEU, the CJEU might have implicitly taken into con-
sideration the modifications on the provisions on direct access for annulment by natural or legal persons in 
its rulings of 13 January 2015. 
Indeed, Article 263(4) of the TFEU now allows ‘Any natural or legal person ( . . . ) (to) institute proceedings 
against an act addressed to that person or which is of direct and individual concern to them, and against a 
regulatory act which is of direct concern to them and does not entail implementing measures’. However, 
due to the lack of a clear definition of the notion of ‘regulatory act’ in the Lisbon Treaty, the exact meaning 
remained until recently the subject of a lively debate amongst scholars.118 Jans even explicitly referred to the 
decision of the European Commission that was at stake in Greenpeace, stating that, in any event, this deci-
sion could not be qualified as a ‘regulatory act’.119 Other commentators assumed that the widening up of the 
admissibility conditions by the Lisbon Treaty could have a positive impact on the access to the EU courts by 
the public in the environmental sector.120 That said, in its recent Inuit Tapiriit Kanatimi-decision, the General 
Court, after having carried out a literal, historical and teleological interpretation of the latter provision,121 
held that ‘regulatory acts’ must be understood as covering all acts of general application apart from legisla-
tive acts.122 In October 2013 this view was confirmed by the CJEU.123 In Microban the General Court accepted 
that a decision that was adopted by the Commission in the exercise of its implementing powers, could be 
qualified as a ‘regulatory act’.124 Notwithstanding the low expectations of some commentators, the recent 
case law on Article 263(4) of the TFEU thus seems capable of lessening the burden of admissibility for annul-
ment actions, at least to a certain extent. 
Still, ironically, the high hopes for a more broad access to justice were soon brought back down by the 
rigid stance of the EU courts on the condition of ‘direct concern’ in the same case law. For, seeing that the 
General Court’s recent case law indicates that having its economic situation affected by a decision is not 
enough to be directly concerned by a regulatory act and to be granted standing before EU courts, it remains 
to be seen to what extent ‘mere’ environmental effects linked could be qualified as having ‘direct concern’ 
for private individuals or environmental NGOs.125 
B. Beyond the Aarhus Regulation?
The above-featured analysis evinces that the rationale underpinning the CJEU’s stance on access to justice 
in environmental cases contains some major flaws, especially taking into account the limited evidence so far 
that the detour via the national courts is effectively capable of bridging the major loopholes in the system 
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of judicial protection present at the EU level for direct environmental actions. Likewise, the recent case law 
reinforces the view that the CJEU is not willing to put its well-settled Plaumann-approach up for debate. 
Neither does it seem prepared to let it go its traditional ‘dual-track interpretation’ of the EU system of legal 
remedies. 
Faced with the highly conservative approach of the EU courts concerning admissibility requirements, 
an obvious solution would be an amendment of the TFEU in order to allow for a better access to justice in 
environmental cases at the EU level. However, as already held by other commentators, it is impossible to 
envisage that the Member States would be prepared to initiate an intergovernmental conference only to 
consider an amendment to Article 263(4) of the TFEU any time soon.126 In fact, with the adoption of the 
Aarhus Regulation the EU legislator wanted to circumvent the impossibility to amend ex Article 230(4) of 
the TEC merely to allow a more broad access to justice in environmental cases. 
In the face of the limited options to improve the EU system of legal remedies against the backdrop of the 
international environmental obligations incumbent upon the EU, a number of commentators blame the 
CJEU for having missed out a unique chance for ‘an easy fix’ of its blatant inadequacies.127 Up to a certain 
point this reasoning holds ground. Arguably, a more generous approach towards the Aarhus Convention 
by the CJEU might have served as a catalyst for environmental justice at the EU level and, perhaps even 
more importantly, a wake up-call for the EU legislator. In addition, it is abundantly clear that widening up 
the scope ratione materiae of the Aarhus Regulation was necessary to come forward to the requirements of 
Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention.128 As aptly pointed out by Advocate General Jääskinen in his Opinion 
of 8 May 2014, the European Commission could only come up with one single example of the specific 
application of the internal review procedure, namely the authorisation to place a GMO on the market. 
Consequently, the field of GMOs and the placement on the market of chemicals in accordance with the 
REACH Regulation appear to be the main area in which the internal review procedure will be applied by the 
EU institutions in the near future.129 
Having said this, it remains at best doubtful if another outcome of the proceedings – for instance a sce-
nario in which the CJEU would have upheld the view of the General Court – would have significantly bet-
tered the position of the environmental NGOs before the EU courts. Even more so, it might be portended 
that the General Court, with its exclusive reliance on the implementation principle, barred the CJEU from 
assessing the direct effect of Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention from a different viewpoint.
Both the Aarhus Compliance Committee and the General Court seem to presuppose that the existing 
internal review procedure, provided its material scope is further widened, might be capable of fulfilling the 
requirements of Article 9(3) and (4) of the Aarhus Convention. However, a number of observers, including 
myself, questioned this premise in earlier writings.130 In itself, Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention does 
not lay down many specific requirements as to the substantial guarantees that have to be provided in the 
context of the available administrative or judicial procedures to challenges acts or omissions that might con-
travene the applicable provisions of environmental law. Still, it remains uncontested that Article 9(3) of the 
Aarhus Convention should be read in conjunction with Article 9(4) and (5) of the Aarhus Convention, which 
requires that the procedures chosen for must provide adequate and effective remedies, they must be fair, 
equitable and timely and not prohibitively expensive. As Ebbesson rightly pointed out, the requirements 
of fair and equitable procedures will be the key considerations when administrative procedures are to be 
examined in the light of the Aarhus Convention standards.131 
As such, the internal review mechanism, even if it would also encompass acts of a general nature, can-
not be qualified as an ‘adequate and effective’ legal remedy in the light of the third pillar of the Aarhus 
Convention.132 
First, the internal review procedure merely allows environmental NGOs to request the EU bodies and insti-
tutions to reconsider the contested acts. In contrast to other administrative review procedures, such as the 
review by the European Ombudsman, an internal review does not offer a review track that can be qualified 
as impartial, adequate and fair. Obviously, EU institutions and bodies will not be very keen on frequently 
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reviewing their own acts, which are often the result of hard and long negotiations and political compro-
mises. This is also illustrated by the above-analysed administrative practice of the internal review to date. So 
far not a single EU act has been reconsidered by the EU institutions under the internal review procedure. 
Second, actions brought before EU courts pursuant to Article 12 of the Aarhus Regulation only concern 
the written reply of the EU institution and thus not relate to the underlying administrative act. Admittedly, 
an eventual finding that a written reply is vitiated by an error of law will inevitably reflect back on the legal-
ity of the underlying decisions. In addition, environmental NGOs might also request an examination of the 
substance of matter by means of a plea of illegality. This being the case, it still remains doubtful whether such 
indirect legality review would suffice in the light of the Aarhus Convention. In fact, the possibilities to pursue 
an effective substantial legal review of an EU act are further compounded by the important time delays that 
come into play when the internal review procedure is followed up by a subsequent legal challenge before 
court. To illustrate this point further, one merely has to measure up the length of the proceedings that led to 
the rulings of the CJEU in Vereniging Milieudefensie. All in all, it took a staggering six years for the EU courts 
to pronounce themselves on the merits of the case, which did not even relate to a ‘substantial’ written reply. 
Some of the actions had in the meantime already lost their purpose since they related to decisions that 
already expired in 2012. Absent any effective access to injunctive relief before EU courts in such cases and 
taking into consideration the consistent prevalence of the Plaumann-test for direct legal challenges of EU 
acts, it remains hard to submit that the requirements set out by Article 9(4) of the Aarhus Convention will be 
observed whenever a more encompassing internal review procedure will be established.
Third, it must be reiterated that the personal scope of the Aarhus Regulation does not comply with 
Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention as natural persons have been left out of the personal scope of the 
internal review procedure. 
Thus the harsh criticism on the rulings of the CJEU needs to be adjusted in some ways. In contrast to 
what has been upheld by some commentators, a different outcome of the lawsuit before the CJEU would 
not necessarily have led to an ‘easy fix’ for the inadequacy of the EU’s system of legal remedies. In fact, it 
might be portended that even when the CJEU would have upheld the rulings of the General Court the bat-
tle for a better access to justice in environmental cases would be far from over. Absent any more effective 
means of administrative review procedure, the EU would still fall short in complying with its obligations 
under Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention. Internal review procedures, even with a more broad material 
scope, are ill equipped to implement the requirements set out by the Aarhus Convention as regards access 
to justice. It must indeed be expected that requests for internal review will hardly ever urge the competent 
EU institution to reconsider its original decision.
V. Outlook 
From all the foregoing it can be concluded that the pursuit of a better access to justice in environmental 
cases at the EU level has given rise to a scenario with distinct Kafkaesque features, in which procedural 
arguments have so far in succeeded in blocking access to EU courts for environmental NGOs and the wider 
public. After a decade of fruitless efforts to gain direct access to the EU courts in order to challenge EU acts, 
environmental civil society associations had hoped that the Aarhus Regulation might do away with the per-
sistent obstructions for environmental litigation at the EU level. 
However, the woes of the environmental NGOs are far from over. As has become evident from the above-
conducted analysis, this hope proved to be false. Instead of being a catalyst for more environmental justice 
at the EU level, the rulings of the CJEU of 13 January 2015 have taken away any prospect of tangible pro-
gress for the coming years. Just as Kafka’s doorkeeper kept ‘the man from the country’ waiting for years 
before finally closing down the gate he was guarding, the CJEU re-closed the door that had been cautiously 
opened by the rulings of the General Court of 14 June 2012 and reaffirmed the restrictive interpretation of 
the internal review procedure. With its refusal to use the Aarhus Convention as a reference criterion for the 
purpose of reviewing the legality of the Aarhus Regulation, the CJEU quashed all expectations on the part of 
those who believed that the EU judges would finally be found prepared to call time upon its restrictive and, 
according to many, outdated Plaumann-approach in environmental cases. 
Strikingly reminiscent of Kafka’s doorkeeper, the CJEU decided to disregard Article 9(3) of the Aarhus 
Convention, this in spite of the explicit reference to the latter provision in the Aarhus Regulation. The indi-
rect result thereof is that it confined the relevance of the Aarhus Regulation to decisions that are capable of 
affecting the interests of the addressees of those decisions, thereby excluding administrative review for the 
major bulk of the EU acts in the environmental sphere. 
Although the rulings of the CJEU can be framed in its long-standing case law on the invocability of provi-
sions of international agreements, they remain disappointing on many levels. Not only do the rulings create 
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the impression of a court that is unprepared to apply the same rigour it is demanding from national courts 
with regard to standing requirements in environmental cases, they also underscore the unwillingness of the 
CJEU to rethink its much-criticised approach towards the Aarhus Convention. The outcome of the appeal is 
all the more disturbing since the CJEU had before it two alternative approaches which might have allowed 
it to carry out a legality review of the Aarhus Regulation without moving too far away from its traditional 
case law on the legal effects of international agreements in the EU legal order. Admittedly, some might 
submit that part of the blame needs be attributed to the General Court which, through its exclusive reli-
ance on the implementation principle, undeliberately barred the CJEU from assessing the direct effect of 
Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention in a more broad perspective. That said, the CJEU’s repudiation of the 
Aarhus Convention still stands in sharp contrast to the explicit commitment on the part of the EU legislator 
to implement Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention by the internal review procedure. Whereas some might 
argue that the recent progressive case law of the CJEU as regards access to justice at the national level partly 
offsets its restrictive case law in relation to direct actions against EU acts, this article amply revealed that 
preliminary ruling procedures before national courts – if available – are incapable of completely remedy-
ing the loopholes in legal review at the EU level in the context of environmental cases. It is submitted that 
enhanced protection for national courts should rather be seen as a complement for the review-options avail-
able at the EU level than as a justification for the EU courts to uphold their well-established Plaumann-test in 
the context of direct challenges to EU acts. Along those lines, the recent rulings of the CJEU serve as a stark 
reminder of the sharp inconsistency that is currently present in the case law at the EU level. 
However, there might be a silver lining to this dark cloud hanging over public interest litigation at the EU 
level. In spite of the ample criticism to which the rulings of the CJEU will undoubtedly lead, they still have 
the benefit of clarity. It may serve as a wake up-call for the EU legislator. Indeed, the decisions of the General 
Court of 14 June 2012, while arguably more progressive in relation to the Aarhus Convention, would have 
brought about only limited changes to the precarious position of environmental NGOs before the EU courts. 
Even if the rulings had been confirmed by the CJEU on appeal, they would leave the other obvious deficien-
cies that are attached to the internal review procedure unaddressed. 
However, most fundamentally, pursuant to Article 216 of the TFEU the EU courts themselves are bound by 
the international agreements that are concluded by the EU. As was pointed out by the Aarhus Compliance 
Committee in 2011, the relevant provisions of the TFEU are drafted in such a way that they can be inter-
preted in line with the standards enshrined in the Aarhus Convention. Rather than sticking to an essentially 
flawed and outdated internal review procedure, a reconsideration of the quasi-constitutional status of the 
Plaumann-doctrine by the EU courts probably constitutes the most comprehensive solution to the decade-
long stand-off between the environmental NGOs and the EU judges. In the light of the disappointing out-
come of the first string of cases in relation to the internal review procedure, the CJEU should reconsider its 
vehement rejection of the Aarhus Convention in relation to direct actions against EU acts. Embracing the 
logic underpinning the third pillar of the Aarhus Convention would mean a great leap forward in the pur-
suit of the rule of law in environmental cases at the EU level. Sooner or later the CJEU will have to cross the 
Rubicon and come to terms with the Aarhus Convention. A future non-compliance finding by the Aarhus 
Compliance Committee might serve as an additional trigger.
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